| Service provider accesses your data |
Provider only constrained by policies, not technology |
You are the service provider |
TEE blocks access |
| Internal data leaks |
Per-org at best |
Your responsibility |
Per-user keys (even admins can't read others' data) |
| Patching & upgrades |
Handled by provider |
Your responsibility |
Handled |
|
| Physical facility security |
Data center-grade |
Likely weaker than data center-grade |
Data center-grade |
| Cloud provider software attacks |
Exposed |
No cloud provider |
Difficult, not immune (side channels & firmware) |
| Side-channel attacks |
Exposed |
You control co-tenancy |
Residual risk (provider controls hypervisor) |
| Cloud provider physical attacks |
Exposed |
No cloud provider |
Hardened, not immune |
| Sophisticated physical attacks |
Exposed |
Sophisticated adversaries could likely penetrate |
Much harder with TEEs, but not impossible |
|
| Internet CAs & browser vendors |
Need to trust |
Need to trust (unless air-gapped) |
Need to trust |
| Nvidia/AMD/Intel hardware |
Need to trust |
Need to trust |
Need to trust |
| Open-source ecosystem |
Need to trust |
Need to trust |
Need to trust (TEE limits blast radius) |
| Source-to-binary trust (CI/CD) |
Opaque / unverifiable |
You build it yourself |
Yes, conditional on trusting GitHub CI |
| Third-party audit integrity |
SOC 2 (narrow scope) |
Self-assessed |
Pending |